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In th~ Supr~m~ Court of th~ 
Stat~ of Utah 
JOHN S. DAVIS, d.b.a. GEN-
E\'A LUl\IBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Vs. 
PAYNE AND DAY, INC., 
A Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
R~spond~nt' s Bn~f 
CASE 
NO. 9386 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is the second appeal for this case. John S. 
Davis, d.b.a. Geneva Lumber Company Vs. Payne and 
Day, Inc., a corporation, 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P2d 337. 
Respondent took the first appeal from an order of dis-
missal granted by the court at the end of respondent's 
case. This court stated that the evidence, if believed by 
the trier of the facts, showed that the respondent here 
was entitled to relief, and remanded the case for a new 
trial. 
Upon the second trial, made to the court sitting 
without a jury, the Hon. Will L. Hoyt granted plaintiff 
judgment based upon detailed findings of fact. De-
fendant below prosecuted this appeal from that judg-
ment and an order denying a new trial. 
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2 
Because we believe that at this stage of the pro-
ceedings there remains only fact questions, we quote 
the Findings of Fact, citing the record relied upon for 
each finding. It is remembered that the plaintiff below 
is the respondent. 
"1. That at all times involved herein, the plaintiff, 
John S. Davis, was doing business under the name and 
style of Geneva Lumber Company; the defendant, Payne 
and Day, Inc., was at all times involved herein a corp-
oration organized under the laws of the State of Utah. 
( Tr. 15, 21, 461. ) 
"2. That, during the year 1957, the defendant corp-
oration caused to be constructed sixty-one homes in the 
Orem and Provo areas, for sale to prospective purchasers. 
(Tr. 250, 368, 463, 533). 
"3. That C. E. Slavens was employed by the de-
fendant as a general construction superintendent, to 
oversee and supervise the construction of the homes; 
that he was so employed under written contracts which 
are in evidence herein and which, among other things, 
provide that he should share in the profits arising from 
savings effected through construction of the houses at 
less than the estimated costs; that Mr. Slavens acted 
as construction superintendent throughout the construc-
tion period and the houses w~re built under his direction 
by various contractors. (Tr. 252-6, 368, 513-14; Exh. 20, 
21, 22.) 
"4. That between February 21, 1957, and Sep-
tember 23, 1957, plaintiff and defendant entered into 
and executed a series of six written contracts, substan-
tially similar in form, and identified as plaintiff's ex-
hibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, in which the plaintiff agreed 
to furnish to the defendant corporation certain specified 
materials in specified quantities to be used in the con-
struction of the sixty-one homes and the defendant 
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agreed to pay stipulated prices for such materials. (Tr. 
11 ff, 16; Exh's. 6 to 11 inclusive). 
"5. That C. E. Slavens, construction superintend-
ent of defendant, prepared these contracts and the ma-
terial lists attached thereto as part thereof, and nego-
tiated with the plaintiff for bids upon such materials 
and procured the signing of the contracts by the plaintiff 
and by the corporate officers of the defendant; that all 
transactions between plaintiff and defendant concern-
ing the furnishing of material for the sixty-one homes 
herein involved were conducted on behalf of defendant 
by its construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens. ( Tr. 
16, 164, 252-6, 258-264, 274-9, 392-3, 497-500, 511, 
534). 
"6. That there was attached to each contract, 
plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, a detailed list of 
the materials to be furnished, with quantities indicated; 
that in each case these were set forth in two groups re-
ferred to as "Package 1" and "Package 2", respectively; 
that the "Package 1" list covered items known as fram-
ing materials, and "Package 2" lists covered finishing 
materials. (Tr. 6 ff; Exh's. 6-11 inclusive). 
"7. That each of the contracts contained provisions 
substantially identical, as follows: 
" 'It is mutually agreed that any additions or 
deletions in the materials to be furnished are to 
be given in writing by the Party of the Second 
Part (defendant) to Party of the First Part 
(plaintiff) , and the value of the change, based 
upon prices quoted in the attached lists, shall 
either be added or subtracted from the original 
contract. 
**** 
" 'It is understood that delivery vvill be made 
and billed by package number as per attached 
lists.' 
( Exh's. 6-11 inclusive). 
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"8. That the plaintiff furnished to the defendant 
the materials specified in the material lists attached to 
the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, and 
from time to time billed the defendant for such mater-
ials, each such billing being identified by package num-
ber as provided in the contracts; that plaintiff received 
payment for the materials in the stated quantities as 
specified in the materials lists, parts of the contracts, and 
makes no claim herein for any part of such specified 
materials. (Tr. 415, 435). 
"9. That in addition to the materials as specified 
in the material lists, parts of plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, 
inclusive, plaintiff delivered to the projects for use in 
construction of the homes other materials not mentioned 
in the respective material lists, referred to in this case 
for convenience as "extras," of the nature and in the 
quantities as specified in plaintiff's exhibit 4, and plain-
tiff also delivered to the projects for use in construction 
of the homes materials of the kind mentioned in the 
respective materials lists, but in excess of the quantities 
therein listed, referred to in this case for convenience as 
"overages" in the quantities specified in plaintiff's ex-
hibit 5. (Tr. 27, 85-8, 93-7, 186-7, 332, 401, 417, 605-6; 
Exh's 4, 5, 17). 
"10. That the defendant gave no written orders 
for delivery of any "extras" or "overages" to any of the 
construction projects. (Tr. 85, 88, 163). 
"11. That the materials thus delivered were furn-
ished by plaintiff on the oral direction and instructions 
of C. E. Slavens, defendant's construction superintendent, 
and such materials were used in the course of construc-
tion of the sixty-one houses. (Tr. 29-32, 85-88, 160, 181, 
232, 320). 
"12. That no record was kept by defendant of 
materials delivered to the job sites, and that no receipts 
for deliveries were signed by anyone on behalf of de-
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fcndant. (Tr. 64-67, 175-176, 214, 266, 270, 303-4, 307-
9' 3 2 7' 3 7 3-4' 50 1 ) . 
"13. --rhat plaintiff kept itemized book records and 
an invoice file showing "extras" and "overages" delivered 
to the respective job sites, plaintiff's exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 
17, and that deliveries were in fact made as shown by 
these records. (Tr. 33-37; Exh's. 1, 2, 3, 17). 
"14. That at the times when plaintiff billed de-
fendant for materials specified in the materials lists, 
parts of the contracts, exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, and 
received payment therefor, plaintiff was required to sign 
receipts prepared by defendant's construction superin-
tendent, C. E. Slavens, or under his direction; that these 
were on printed forms supplied by the First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., through which bank the defend-
ant was procuring funds for financing construction of 
the homes, such receipts being parts of defendant's ex-
hibits 12, 13, 13-B, 14, 14-B, 14-C, 15, 15-A, 15-B, 15-
C, 16, 16-A, 16-B, 16-C, and 16-D. (Tr. 204-211, 
276-8; Exhibits named). 
"15. That these receipts and lien waivers were re-
quired and payments of the amounts therein specified 
were made upon invoices or billings made by plaintiff to 
defendant; that said invoices or billings were for mater-
ials delivered as per the material lists, parts of the con-
tracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, without item-
ization; that these invoices or billings were for the exact 
sums specified in such material lists, "Package 1" or 
"Package 2" totals, as the case may be; and that pay-
ments in each instance also corresponded with the con-
tract price total for rna terial listed in the particular 
"packages." (Tr. 204-211; Exh's. 6-11 inclusive; Exh's. 
12-16 inclusive). 
"16. That at the times of presentation of these bills 
and invoices and executions of the receipts and lien 
\\·aivers no discussion was had between the parties as 
to materials being supplied other than or in addition to 
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the rna terials specified in the so-called "packages" or 
material lists attached to the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 
6 to 11, inclusive. (Tr. 566). 
"17. That duplicate deliveries were made by plain-
tiff to the first project in Orem, Utah, for the reason 
that orders placed were delayed in delivery, necessita-
ting the plaintiff obtain some of the same materials else-
where; that as result thereof, there was some carry-over 
throughout the construction of the projects; that in each 
instance, plaintiff inventoried materials thus left over, 
and that defendant was in each instance given proper 
credit in plaintiff's accounts for all items charged against 
one project which were thereafter transferred for use 
upon subsequent projects. (Tr. 18-27, 134-35, 140-41, 
266, 325, 395). 
"18. That there was no understanding or agree-
ment between the plaintiff and the defendant that the 
plaintiff was required under the contracts, plaintiff's ex-
hibits 6 to 11, inclusive, to deliver any materials other 
than those specifically listed upon the material lists part 
of the contracts, in the amounts therein specified. (Tr. 
211, 238-9, 566; Exh's. 6-11 inclusive). 
"19. That not later than July 1, 1957, defendant 
was on notice by reason of written billing that plaintiff 
was charging and expecting to be paid for "extras" and 
"overages" he delivered to the projects, but defendant, 
through its construction superintendent, C. E. Slavens, 
continued to authorize and order such "extras" and 
"overages" without requiring written order therefor. 
(Tr. 60, 404-5, 410-11; Exh. 19). 
"20. That plaintiff on January 31, 1958, presented 
defendant with his statement for all extra and additional 
materials furnished for construction of the sixty-one 
houses; and that payment has never been made by or on 
behalf of defendant to plaintiff on this statement. (Tr. 
413-15, 446; Exh. 30). 
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"21. That plaintiff and defendant entered into 
other contracts, not in issue herein, for the roofing of 
the sixty-one homes herein involved, these contracts con-
taining a similar prohibition against changes without 
prior written order of defendant; that under those con-
tracts plaintiff provided roofing materials in addition to 
the amounts required by those contracts upon oral order 
of the said C. E. Slavens, without written order, and 
that defendant paid plaintiff for such additional roofing 
materials, "vithout regard to the contract provision re-
quiring prior written order. (Tr. 101-108, 193-4, 197-8, 
407-13). 
"22. That subsequent to the execution of certain 
of the contracts, plaintiff's exhibits 6 to 11, inclusive, 
and without prior notice to plaintiff, defendant changed 
plans of some of the houses being constructed, used ma-
terials delivered by plaintiff in making such changes, 
and plaintiff learned thereof only after the fact, when 
additional materials were required of him. (Tr. 99-101, 
285-6, 294-6, 301-03, 3 7 6, 500-1' 516-1 7' 596, 
602) 0 
"23. That plaintiff at all times herein involved be-
lieved and relied upon the belief that defendant's con-
struction superintendent, C. E. Slavens, had authority 
to order extras and additional materials for use in con-
struction of the homes and to do so without signing 
orders in writing therefor. (Tr. 160, 211, 421-3, 452). 
"24. That neither plaintiff nor his employee, Clyde 
Davis, in signing the receipts referred to in finding of 
fact no. 14, above, intended such receipts or any of them 
to constitute acknowledgment of payment in full for all 
material furnished by plaintiff for construction of the 
house or houses referred to in the respective receipts, but 
on the contrary, intended such receipts to acknowledge 
payment for the materials specified in the respective 
material lists and referred to collectively as "Package 1, 
or Package 2"; that the plaintiff and Clyde Davis did, 
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however, intend said receipts to operate as waivers of 
any lien which plaintiff might claim against the real 
estate referred to in the respective receipts. (Tr. 211, 
437-446, 455-7). 
"25. That neither the defendant nor its construc-
tion superintendent, C. E. Slavens, was misled or de-
ceived by the signing of the receipts in the form in which 
they were signed, and that the defendant did not suffer 
damage by reason of the signing or delivery of such re-
ceipts. (Tr. 160, 211, 455-7)." 
On the foregoing findings, the trial court concluded 
that appellant's construction superintendent had appar-
ent and actual authority to order the extra materials not 
on material lists, part of the contracts, and materials on 
the lists in greater amounts than therein called for, that 
on the facts the requirement of the contracts for written 
modification was in effect waived, that the receipts and 
lien waivers were not a bar to this action, and that 
respondent was entitled to judgment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED ON THIS AP-
PEAL WERE SETTLED BY THIS COURT ON 
THE FIRST APPEAL AND ARE "THE LAW OF 
THE CASE." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE FACTS 
AGAINST APPELLANT; THE RECORD SUP-
PORTS THESE FINDINGS; AND UNDER THE 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, THE 
JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND. 
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.ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED ON THIS AP-
PEAL \VERE SETTLED BY THIS COURT ON 
THE FIRST APPEAL AND ARE "THE LAW OF 
THE CASE". 
We take the rule to be that where an appellate 
court in its opinion states a rule or principle of law 
which is directly raised on such appeal, it is necessary 
that the appellate court's decision on such rule or prin-
ciple must be adhered to throughout all the subsequent 
proceedings in such case, both in the trial court and upon 
a subsequent appeal, unless: (a) A change in the law 
has in the meantime been made by legislative action; 
or (b) a change in the law has in the meantime been 
effected by a decision on precisely the same question by 
a higher appellate court. Petty Vs. Clark ( 1948) 113 
Utah 205; 912 P2d 589. Of course, the conditions set 
forth under (a) and (b) above do not prevail in this 
case. 
Under Point I of its brief, appellant argues its 
theory on the effect of the "Parole Evidence" rule on 
certain evidence admitted by the trial court. This point 
was argued on the first appeal; it was directly before 
this court; and it was resolved by this court in its de-
cision therein. John S. Davis, etc. v. Payne and Day, 
Inc., Supra, Headnote 2. We belabor this question no 
further. 
Under Point II of its brief, appellant argues error 
on the question of evidence admitted to show the ex-
tent of Mr. Slavens', the construction superintendent's 
authority. There is no essential difference between this 
evidence offered on the first trial and the evidence of-
fered and admitted on the second trial. This question 
was urged before this court on the first appeal; it was 
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argued extensively, and the question was decided against 
the appellant. We point out that there was never any 
question as to whether Slavens was an agent of the corp-
oration. The sole question was the extent of the author-
ity. The trial court in following the decision of this 
court on the first appeal admitted the evidence com-
plained of. We submit that the trial court did not 
commit error and that the decision on the first appeal 
herein laid this issue at rest. 
The evidence objected to under Point III of ap-
pellant's brief concerning payments made to respondent 
under other contracts not in issue herein in connection 
with the same construction project, though changes were 
not authorized in writing, was offered at the first trial, 
objected to by appellant, its admissibility argued before 
this court on the first appeal, and considered in this 
court's opinion. We deem this point sufficiently ans-
wered. 
The argument of the appellant under Point IV of 
its brief that Slavens did not have the apparent auth-
ority claimed by respondent was on the first trial pre-
sented before the court at pretrial, and upon the trial. 
It was argued before this court on the first appeal, and 
the question was decided by this court in that decision. 
The trier of the fact on the second trial found that Mr. 
Slavens had the actual authority from the corporate 
principal to take the action he did regarding extras and 
overages. The court further found that he in fact did 
make such changes, and we submit that the record 
amply supports this finding. 
We deem one matter raised by appellant in its brief 
should be answered, though we assert that we have 
answered it step by step throughout this long and ardous 
proceeding. Appellant attempts to point out that there 
was some "secret agreement" between respondent and 
Mr. Slavens. Appellant completely ignors the fact that 
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Mr. Slavens was the agent of the appellant; that he was 
not the agent of the respondent; and that under his 
\vritten contract of employment, and under his testimony 
at the trial, he was under a duty as agent to the appel-
lant, not to the respondent. We do not know what claim 
appellant might be able to successfully assert against 
Mr. Slavens, but that issue is not before the court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE FACTS 
AGAINST APPELLANT; THE RECORD SUP-
PORTS THESE FINDINGS; AND UNDER THE 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, THE 
JUDGMENT SHOULD STAND. 
This is a law case. We deem it horn book law that 
upon a finding of fact made when the evidence is in 
dispute, should there be evidence upon which the trier 
of the fact could have relied to resolve the dispute, this 
court will not upset that finding. 
In the statement of facts, we have set forth the 
findings of the trier of the fact and referred to extensive 
evidence in the record to support these findings. 
Of course, there is a dispute of fact. Were there not, 
there would be no litigation. The Hon. Will L. Hoyt, 
trier of the facts, personally observed the witnesses, and 
in fact, participated actively in their interrogation. He 
chose which witnesses and what evidence to believe. 
Without again reviewing this extensive record, under 
this point, we submit that the findings of fact hereto-
fore quoted are amply supported by the record, and 
that as a matter fact, the evidence affirmatively refutes 
appellant's contention as to what the facts were. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no difference between the evidence pre-
sented at the first trial and that on the second trial. The 
law of this case was decided on the first appeal. The 
trier of the fact on the second trial found against appel-
lant, and there is substantial evidence to support this 
finding. We respectfully submit that there is no basis 
for disturbing the findings and judgment of the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN· B. SORENSEN for 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Respondent 
227 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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